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I. Historical foundations of Religion 
and Politics in Turkey
Analysing the relations between religion and state in Turkey, just like other 
structures of Turkey’s Republican era, cannot be possible without making 
comparisons with the Ottoman period and determining the points of rupture 
and continuity between the two eras. Three different approaches appear in 
Ottoman studies on state and religious matters. 
As for the first approach, if one starts by recognizing a duality in legal norms 
existing in the Ottoman world1 it may be proposed that the Ottomans had 
two separate sources of legitimacy: those depending on Islamic canon law 
and those depending on the Sultan’s acts: However this apparently did not 
constitute a structure that would be called “the secular”. 
1 Ömer.Lütfü Barkan, ‘Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Teşkilat ve Müeseselerinin Şer’iliği Meselesi,’ XI:3-4 
İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuasi (1945), pp. 203-204; Karen Barkey, ‘Rethinking Ottoman 
Management of Diversity,’ in A.T. Kuru & A.Stepan, Democracy, Islam & Secularism in Turkey (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 19-21; Haim Gerber, State, Society and Law in Islam (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 61-78; Ümit Hassan, Osmanlı: Örgüt-İnanç-Davranış’tan 
Hukuk-İdeoloji’ye, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003- 5th ed.), pp. 159-242, Uriel Heyd, ‘Eski Osmanlı 
Ceza Hukukunda Kanun ve Şeriat,’ 26 Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi (1983), pp. 633-685; 
Colin Imber, Ebu’s-su’ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997) pp. 
24-111; Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk Adalet (Istanbul: Eren, 2005-2nd ed.), pp. 30-36; İlber 
Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (Istanbul: Hil yayın, 1995-3rd ed.), pp. 154-157 (Not taking an 
explicit side on this issue, İlber Ortaylı confines himself to discussing the matter along the line that 
the Ottoman system could not be defined as a secular one; see Ortaylı, ‘Osmanlı Devletinde Laiklik 
Hareketleri Üzerine,’ in E. Kalaycıoğlu – A.Y.Sarıbay (eds.), Türkiye’de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme 
(İstanbul – Bursa: AlfaAktüel, 2007), pp. 157-170); Erol Özbilgen, Osmanlı Hukuku’nun Yapısı (Istanbul: 
Nihal, 1985), pp. 39-84; Sami Zubaida, İslam Dünyasında Hukuk ve İktidar (İstanbul : İstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), pp. 170-189. Also, for an argument focusing on Cornell Fleischer’s point 
of view, see Hilmi Yavuz, Modernleşme, Oryantalizm ve İslam (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1999-2nd ed.), 
pp. 141-143. 
6Nevertheless, the system that was established in the Republican era may be 
traced back to the dual structure of the Ottomans starting from the 15th cen-
tury when Mehmet II (the Conqueror) had his profane codification.2 
There also exists a second approach which states that the Ottoman structure 
did not have any duality as described above; on the contrary, religion and the 
world, together, had constituted a whole embodied in the person of the Caliph-
Sultan. According to this view, the Ottoman state was a theocratic one, and 
thus the entire state structure took shape according to the rules stipulated by 
Islam. This thesis is supported by the fact that the Caliph-Sultan had religious 
as well as political identities, and both the vizier and the Sheikh ul-Islam, the 
chief religious official of the Ottoman Empire, were second to the sultan in 
political and religious matters.3 
In addition to these two approaches, a third one claims that in the period 
from the Ottoman Empire to the Republican era there has always been state 
control of religion.4 The Caliph/Sultan had the power to appoint as well as to 
dismiss the Sheikh ul-Islam; and the Sheikh ul-Islam would attend to religious 
2 İnalcık claims that, contrary to the general view, the sultan’s authority did not emerge out of his 
position as the caliph of Islam, but originated from a complex military-administrative formation that 
only partially overlapped with Islamic institutions. See The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-
1600 translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), pp. 
70-104, 163-173, 186. Also see Şerif Mardin, ‘Some Notes on Normative Conflicts in Turkey’, in Peter L. 
Berger (ed.), The Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict & Mediation in Pluralist Societies (Boulder-Colorado 
and Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 207-210. E.J. Zürcher and H. van der Linden state that, “Sultan 
did not want to lose the legitimacy the scholars of the Islamic law provided to him, since he claimed 
that he was not only an Islamic monarch, but also a unique and only Islamic leader. Nonetheless, 
the Ottoman sultans were much more successful than those who came before them in incorporat-
ing ulema, the religious scholars into the state apparatus through a strict appointment and control 
system.” ‘Kırılma Hattını Ararken: ‘Medeniyetler Çatışması’ Kavramı Işığında Türk İslamının Türkiye’nin 
AB’ye Katılımındaki Rolü’ in Hollanda Kamu Politikaları Bilimsel Kurulu, (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor 
het Regeringsbeleid) Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye ve İslam translated by Türkevi Research Center (Istanbul: 
“başlık” Yayın Grubu, 2007), p. 124.
3 Ahmet Akgündüz, ‘Osmanlı hukukunda Şer’i Hukuk-Örfi Hukuk İkilemi ve Yasama Organının Yetkileri,’ 
12/2 İslami Araştırmalar (1999), pp. 117-122; Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki 
Tahlilleri I. Kitap: Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş ve Fatih Devri Kanunnameleri (Istanbul: Fey Vakfı Yay, 1990), 
pp. 63-64; Ali. Fuat Başgil, Din ve Laiklik (Istanbul: Kubbealtı, 1942/2007 – 9th ed.), pp. 193-195; İsmail 
Kara, Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi’nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2008 – 2nd ed.), pp. 
63-64; Hayrettin Karaman, İslam Hukuk Tarihi (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2007 – 5th ed.), pp. 260-261; Rasim 
Özdenören, Kafa Karıştıran Kelimeler (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2006 – 7th ed.), pp. 144-145.
4 M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 153; Sami Zubaida, ‘Trajectories of Political Islam: Egypt, Iran and Turkey,’ in 
David Marquand - Ronald L. Netler (eds.), Religion and Democracy (Oxford and Madlen –Massachusetts: 
The Political Quarterly/Blakwell Publishers, 2000), p. 63.
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matters on behalf of the Sultan.5 In this context a separate institutionalized 
power, like the Roman Catholic Church in the West, has never been permitted 
to religious authorities in the Ottoman system.6
Scrutinizing the institutional dimensions of the relations between state and 
religion, one may observe that there exist both continuity and ruptures in va-
rious institutional bodies from the office of Sheikh ul-Islam to the Şer’iye ve 
Evkaf Vekâleti (Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations) and finally 
to the Presidency of Religious Affairs. While Sheikh ul-Islam was responsible 
for judicial, legal, scholarly, administrative and political duties as well as re-
ligious ones,7 the Şer’iye ve Evkaf Vekâleti founded by the Ankara government 
on 4 May 1920 was an institution responsible only for religious matters and 
pious foundations, but this very effective institution was at the ministerial le-
vel as far as its place in the administrative hierarchy is concerned.8 The foun-
ding political authority of the Republican era had preferred to configure the 
institution of Presidency of Religious Affairs as an administrative unit under 
the Prime Ministry.
It seems that the Turkish Republic’s founding elite designed the new Turkish 
state as a modernity project and therefore spared no expenses to satisfy this 
goal. Actually the radical program of reform and Westernization that the Re-
publican cadres pursued in the 1920s and 1930s had earlier started within the 
Ottoman Empire in the mid-nineteenth century, especially with the reception 
of Western codes and political principles. However, the purpose of the new 
leadership in this period not only was to secularize and modernize the state 
5 Murat Akgündüz, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Şeyhülislamlık (İstanbul: Beyan, 2002), pp. 165-183; 301; Ali 
Bardakoğlu, Religion and Society: New Perspectives from Turkey (Ankara: Publications of Presidency of 
Religious Affairs, 2006), p. 9. For the sheikh ul-Islam’s duties in the field of politics and for discussions 
regarding the relations between state and religion, see Esra Yakut, Şeyhülislamlık: Yenileşme Döneminde 
Devlet ve Din (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005), pp. 174-204. According to Poulton, “the duty of the 
leading ulema, the religious scholars, especially of sheikh ul-Islam, the highest ranking mufti, was to 
make sure that sultan’s firmans, imperial decrees, conformed to the Shari’a, the body of the Islamic 
religious law.” See Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent (London: Hurst&Company, 1997), 
pp. 34-35.
6 Actually in the West, it is only the Roman Catholic Church that has historically been a separate 
institution from the State apparatus and has existed as a legal person. By contrast, the Protestant/
Anglican/Evangelical Churches were created as an officium of ‘the State’ who had adhered to the 
Reformation.
7 Murat Akgündüz, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Şeyhülislamlık, (Istanbul: Beyan, 2002), pp. 219-314.
8 Ali Fuat Başgil, Din ve Laiklik (İstanbul: Kubbealtı, 2007 – 9th ed.), p. 202. İsmail Kara describes this 
institution as “... an experience peculiar entirely to Ankara and the new state, although at first sight 
it seems as the projection onto Ankara of Istanbul’s sheikh ul-Islam.” See İsmail Kara, Cumhuriyet 
Türkiyesi’nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, Haziran 2008/ Eylül 2008 – 2nd ed.), 
pp. 57 and 62.
8and the ‘political’, but also to transform society into a modern body. Thus, in 
my view, the biggest difference between Republican and Ottoman Westerni-
zations was the spectrum of their telos; and laicism was one of the pillars for 
the Republican founding elite. 
II. Laic(ité), the Secular, Secularizations, 
Secularisms, Post-secular
Laicité/laicism/laic is used for the state’s control of religion in the public 
sphere as opposed to secularism, which implies the separation of state and 
religion;9 and laiklik (laicité) is the concept that is preferred by Turkey’s Re-
publican decision-making elite in all legislation and other legal regulations 
which actually shape up its substance. I assert that, as a state’s approach to 
religion, the laicism/secularism distinction is significant. However, since every 
society has different socio-political circumstances, the interpretation of se-
cularism and laicism in political and thus legal systems exhibits differences 
as well. Both secularism and laicism are about state politics, law-making, and 
constitutional principles, but for the most they permeate and establish the 
rhythm of a phenomenology of everyday life practices.10 Neither laicism nor 
“(s)ecularism is … a ‘neutral’, power-free space and a set of abstract principles; 
9 For some insightful theoretical analyses of these concepts focusing mainly on Turkey, see Andrew 
Davidson, ‘Hermeneutics and the Politics of Secularism,’ in L.E. Cady & E.S. Hurd (eds.), Comparative 
secularisms in a global age, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 143-158; Andrew Davidson, 
‘Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State? The Challenge of Description,’ in S. Irzık – G. Güzeldere (eds.), Relocating the 
Fault Lines: Turkey beyond the East-West Divide (special issue of 102:2/3 The South Atlantic Quarterly 
(Spring/Summer 2003), pp. 333-350; Andrew Davidson, Secularism Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic 
Reconsideration (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 1998). For another work on secularism 
and laicism distinction see Armando Salvatore, ‘Authority in Question: Secularity, Republicanism and 
‘Communitarianism’ in the Emerging Euro-Islamic Public Sphere,’ 24 Theory, Culture & Society (2007), 
pp. 135-160. However, secular/ism and laic/ism are frequently used as synonyms in the literature. 
See Rossella Bottoni, ‘The Origins of Secularism (Laicism) in Turkey,’ 9 The Ecclesiastical Law Journal 
(2007), pp. 175-186; José Casanova, ‘Catholic and Muslim Politics in Comparative Perspective,’ 1 Taiwan 
Journal of Democracy (2005), pp. 102-107; Dietrich Jung, ‘“Secularism”: A Key to Turkish Politics?,’ in D. 
Jung – C. Raudvere (eds.), Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), pp. 117-137; E. Fuat Keyman, ‘Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey,’ 24 Theory, 
Culture & Society (2007), pp. 215-234. 
10 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
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(they are) embodied in people’s agencies and imaginaries.”11 In other words, 
these concepts are socio-political constructions; thus various secularizations, 
secularisms, and laicisms emerge in different socio-political climates.12 In the 
USA, for example, secularity has been preferred to be interpreted as a state of 
impartiality towards religions and beliefs. In addition to a principle that bans 
the introduction of legislative activities designed to prevent the free practice 
of any religion, the First Amendment to the US Constitution, by means of the 
establishment clause, prevents the Congress from making a law establishing a 
state-religion. The Supreme Court’s formulation regarding the establishment 
clause in the Lemon-Kurtzman case13 may be a key to a particular understan-
ding of secularism: (i) the purpose of no legislative or administrative procedure 
may be religious (secular purpose); (ii) religion must not be affected, either 
positively or negatively, by the implementation of the procedure (primary ef-
fect); and (iii) the state must not show excessive concern for religion because 
of the procedure (excessive entanglement). On the other hand, in the case of 
France, where the shadow of the Catholic Church is still felt, and increasing 
populations of Islam and other faith systems like Sikhism are an issue, a har-
sher interpretation of laicism has been preferred where the Conseil d’Etat has 
a regulative role.
In all countries and in every historical period, secularization has been a coer-
cive process in which the legal powers of the state, the disciplinary powers of 
family and school, and the persuasive powers of government and media have 
been used to produce the secular citizen who agrees to keep religion in the 
private domain. Sometimes this has been done by putting external and forci-
ble constraints on the public political presence of religion, as in the Jacobin 
tradition of laicisme, or in the Soviet Union and contemporary China, or in 
Kemalist Turkey.14
The formations of the secular follow different historical trajectories and have 
different religious genealogies in different places too, yet they are closely 
interconnected with hegemonic impositions of Western modernity and colo-
11 Nilüfer Göle, ‘The Civilizational, Spatial, and Sexual Powes of the Secular,’ in M. Warner, J. VanAntwerpen 
and C. Calhoun (eds), Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2010) p. 254.
12 For a critical review of the study of secularization within sociology, see Philip S. Gorski and Ateş 
Altınordu, ‘After Secularization?,’ 34 Annual Review of Sociology (2008), pp. 55-85.
13 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
14 Partha Chatterjee, ‘Fasting for Bin Laden: The Politics of Secularization in Contemporary India,’ in D. 
Scott and C. Hirschkind (eds.), Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2006), p.60.
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nialism.15 Talal Asad, whom in the religion-secular debate,16 by following the 
work of Michel Foucault and Edward Said, focuses on genealogies of power, 
characterises “the secular” as an epistemic category, “secularism” a “political 
doctrine”, and “secularization” as a historical process.17 Both religion and the 
secular for Asad are “processual” rather than fixed ideologies.18 
It was Jürgen Habermas who first introduced the term post-secular in the Ger-
man Peace Prize lecture in 2001, which he further elaborated in his later wri-
tings. Habermas labels the present era as “postsecular”, in which he has been 
increasingly stressing the importance of cultivating a stance that both reckons 
with the continuing global vitality of religion and emphasizes the importance 
of ‘translating’ the ethical insights of religious traditions with a view to their 
incorporation into a ‘postmetaphysical’ perspective, or in other words into a 
secular idiom.19 For Habermas, we live in a postsecular society where the classic 
assumption of the secularization thesis, whereby religion would disappear from 
public life, has been shown to be wrong. Two important elements – within the 
societal context of Germany and Western Europe – refuted the former theory: 
first, the appearance of public normative debates, such as abortion, stem cell 
research, etc., which also involved clerical institutions as legitimate public 
actors. Second is the visibility of Islam in Europe and its claim for Muslims’ 
rights within the frame of rights based on citizenship.
15 Nilüfer Göle, ‘Manifestations of the Religious-Secular Divide: Self, State, and the Public Sphere,’ in 
L.E. Cady and E. Shakman Hurd (eds), Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) p. 41.
16 For a very illuminating account of this debate see Arvind-Pal S. Mandair and Markus Dressler, 
‘Introduction: Modernity, Religion-Making, and the Postsecular,’ in M. Dressler and A.S. Mandair 
(eds.), Secularism & Religion-Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 4-20.
17 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), p.1, David Scott, ‘Appendix: The Trouble of Thinking – An Interview with Talal 
Asad,’ in D. Scott and C. Hirschkind (eds.), Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 301-302. 
18 Hent de Vries reads Asad as, “He follows Wittgenstein’s recommendation to look for ‘use’, not for 
‘meaning’, steering clear of all attempts to essentialize either ‘religion’ or its supposed counterpart, 
‘the secular’, and insisting instead on seeing both as something ‘processual’ rather than, say, a ‘fixed 
ideology’ (even less that of a ‘particular class’)”: in Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular 
World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), p. 69.
19 See Jürgen Habermas, “Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State?” in F. Schuller, 
Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (translated by Brian McNeil, C.R.V.) (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2005) p.46; Eduardo Mendieta, ‘A Postsecular World Society? On the Philosophical 
Significance of Postsecular Consciousness and the Multicultural World Society: An Interview with 
Jürgen Habermas,’ (translated by Matthias Fritsch), 3 February 2010, <blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/02/03/a-
postsecular-world-society>, accessed 14 June 2013; Jürgen Habermas, ‘“The Political”: The Rational 
Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology,’ in E. Mandieta and J. VanAntwerpen, 
The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 26-28. 
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In his book, Public Religions in the Modern World published in 1994,20 José 
Casanova states that the core and central thesis of the theory of secularism is 
the conceptualization of the modernization process with regard to the struc-
ture, organization and operation of society, and he points to three components 
considered as essential, since Max Weber, in the development of modernity: 
I. the separation of religion from politics, economy, science, etc., because of 
the increasing structural differentiation between the social areas;
II. the privatization of religion within its own field; 
III. the decreasing social importance of the religious beliefs, attachments and 
institutions. 
According to Casanova, only the first and third elements can be implemented. 
Even though the privatization of religion within its own field is part of laicism, 
it is not essential from the perspective of modernization. Casanova’s argument 
is that whether or not unmaking religion a private matter threatens modernity 
depends on how religion becomes public. If it advances, as in Poland, the for-
mation of a civil society, or encourages, as in the USA, public debates about 
the liberal values, then the politicized religion and modernity are in perfect 
harmony with each other. If it on the other hand tries to undermine the civil 
society, as in Egypt, or the individual liberties, as in Iran, then the politicized 
religion really turns into an uprising against modernity and the universal values of 
the Enlightenment.21
Charles Taylor is another prominent scholar to exemplify liberal secularism. In 
Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, Charles Taylor and Joselyn Maclure seek 
to provide “an adequate conceptual analysis of the constitutive principles of 
secularism,” stating that any understanding of secularism must “be approached 
20 J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1994). 
21 For the critique of Casanova and similar ideas, see T. Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity, and the Present (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) and others. Casanova responded 
to these critiques (see “Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad”, in David Scott and Charles 
Hirschkind (eds.), Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006). pp. 12-30). Asad replied to them (see “Responses”, pp. 207-210). For a work 
that takes up these discussions within the context of the concepts of European Secularism and the 
Islam of public sphere, see A. Salvatore, “Power and Authority within European Secularity: From the 
Enlightenment Critique of Religion to the Contemporary Presence of Islam”, The Muslim World (96) 
(4) (2006), pp. 543-561.
12
within the broader problematic of the state’s necessary neutrality toward the 
multiple values, beliefs, and life plans of citizens in modern societies”.22 
Ahmet Kuru coins the terms “passive secularism” and “assertive secularism” 
to imply a state’s neutrality toward various religions by allowing their public 
visibility for the former; and a state’s confining religion to the private sphere 
for the latter.23 
In this context, José Casanova’s related remarks may provide a suitable hint to 
answer the question, “to what extent has Turkey been a secular country?”24: 
“Turkey is seen as too secular for the Islamists, too Sunni for the Alevis and 
too Turkish for the Kurds where Turkish values are strongly showed up.”25 Fuat 
Keyman adds another statement to this frame as, “for non-Muslim minorities 
Turkey is too Muslim”.26 
III. “Diyanet”
I think that in order to understand religion, politics and politics of religion in 
Turkey, as an initial step a governmental organization Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 
(Presidency of Religious Affairs – hereinafter Diyanet)27 should be scrutinized. 
22 Charles Taylor and Joselyn Maclure, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (translated by Jane Marie 
Todd), (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 3 and 11. 
23 Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
24 For an illuminating analysis of “modes of secularism” in Turkey see M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and 
Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 153-163.
25 José Casanova, “Civil society and religion: Retrospective reflections on Catholicism and prospective 
reflections on Islam”, 68:4 Social Research: An International Quarterly (2001), p. 1064.
26 Fuat Keyman, “Assertive secularism in crisis: Modernity, democracy and Islam in Turkey” in L.E. Cady 
& E.S. Hurd (eds.), Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 
143.
27 Translations used for Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı vary in the literature, including terms as Department 
of the Affairs of Piety, Directorate-General of Religious Affairs, General Directorate of Religious Af-
fairs, Religious Affairs Department, Directorate of Religious Affairs, Office of Religious Affairs, and 
Religious Affairs Directorate. For the English term I prefer to use “The Presidency of Religious Affairs”, 
since that happens to be the term used by the institution on various occasions (like the Diyanet’s 
official website though currently the only foreign language pages are in Arabic) and in translation 
of the current constitution of the Republic of Turkey: see http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/. However, yet 
in another official website of Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Turkey’s parliament, the term “Department 
of Religious Affairs” has been used. See: http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/
THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf
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Diyanet is a secular/laic administrative unit in the Republic of Turkey esta-
blished in 1924 to execute services regarding Islamic faith and practices, to 
enlighten society about religion, and to carry out the management of places 
of prayer. 
Diyanet was established by the Act dated 3 March 1340 (1924) no. 429 “on the 
Abolishment of The Ministries of Şeriyye (Religious Affairs) and Evkaf (Pious 
Foundations)”. By abolishing the Şeriye Vekaleti (Ministry of Religious Affairs), 
a new administrative unit called the Diyanet İşleri Reisliği (Presidency of Reli-
gious Affairs) was constituted. In other words, the new regulation placed the 
management of religious affairs in the hands of an administrative bureau, not 
in those of a ministry in the cabinet. In terms of administrative law, ministry 
ranks top in the hierarchy of the central administration, and is a political unit. 
Not placing the institution of “religion” in a political body was a key part of 
the overall policy of the founding political decision-making elite of Turkey 
who aimed to establish a secular state and transform society into a modern 
one. They did not want to have a unit within the cabinet dealing with religi-
ous affairs. Instead, by assigning religious affairs to an administrative unit, the 
ruling elite both took religion under their control and at the same time tried 
to break the potentially sacred significance of the Diyanet.
In my opinion, Act no. 429 is very significant in the construction of a secular 
system in Republican Turkey. The first article of Act no. 429 states that the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs has been formed as a part of the Republic to 
administer all provisions concerning faith, rituals and institutions of Islam. The 
article also explicitly pronounces that all other affairs are legislated by the 
parliament, namely the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and executed by 
the Cabinet formed by the former body. This was an attempt by the decision-
making elite of early Republican Turkey to secularise the sources and references 
of the legal system that has mostly been achieved.
Apparently, the temptation to make secularism the equivalent of religion seems 
generally stronger in countries where secularism came about at the cost of a 
bitter struggle against a dominant religion; think, for example, of the Catholic 
church of Restoration France or Islam in the former caliphate of Turkey.28
The purpose of the new leadership in this period was to secularize and moder-
nize not only the state and the ‘political’, but also to transform society into a 
28 Charles Taylor and Joselyn Maclure, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (translated by Jane Marie 
Todd), (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 14.
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modern body. In fact, the radical program of reform and Westernization that 
the Republican cadres pursued in the 1920’s and 1930’s had already started 
earlier in the Ottoman times, namely in the mid-nineteenth century, especially 
with the reception of Western codes and political principles. Thus, in my view, 
the biggest difference between Ottoman and Republican westernizations/se-
cularizations was the spectrum of their telos; and laicité was the pillar for the 
Republican founding elite, which designed the ‘Presidency of Religious Affairs’ 
as an administrative tool to ‘regulate’ Islam. 
Since 1924, the Diyanet has been under the auspices of the office of the Pri-
me Minister, and the president of the institution has been appointed by the 
President of the Republic of Turkey on the proposal of the Prime Minister. This 
administration regulates the operation of more than 85,000 registered mos-
ques and employs more than 117,000 imams, Quran instructors, muezzins, and 
other religious workers, all of whom are civil servants with regular salaries. In 
time, the mission of the Diyanet has been expanded from simply supervising 
faith and worship. Article 154 of the 1961 Constitution of Turkey provided 
that the Diyanet was incorporated in the general administration to discharge 
the function prescribed by a special law.29 That particular law was put into 
power after a long process of various debates on 15 August 1965. Act no. 633 
on the organization and duties of the Diyanet, redefined its task in terms of 
“conducting the affairs of belief, worship and enlightening society on religious 
matters and the moral aspects of the Islamic religion”. 
To create an administrative body that offers services to meet the general, daily 
needs of practicing Islam may be justifiable as ‘public service’ where a majori-
ty of the population belongs to Islam; however to assign to this organization 
a function such as ‘conducting the affairs of belief, worship and enlightening 
society on religious matters and the moral aspects of the Islamic religion’ 
whose content is legally ambiguous, indicates that the state preferred to use 
the organization as an ideological tool in a manner different from the original 
intent of the founding elite. Such a wording in a law on an issue as political 
as the regulation of religion in a secular state reveals that the state’s choice 
of propagating and protecting a particular religion is completely incompa-
tible with the notion of a secular state. However, one may assume that the 
legislators of the 1961 Constitution aimed to correct the Kemalist mistake of 
not adequately recognising the role of Islam in the formation of the Turkish 
individuals’ identity. The attempt to create a moral order based on Islamic va-
29 1961 Constitution of Turkey, <www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf>, accessed 25 June 
2013.
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lues by state apparatus was fortified by Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution 
which provided the Diyanet to carry out its mission within the framework of 
the principle of secularism and with the goal of achieving national solidarity 
and integrity. This actually is a pronouncement of the significant relationship 
between religion and nationalism which in fact has been going on within the 
context of the Turkish nation-building process with roots not only in the Re-
publican times but in the late Ottoman period as well.30 In the framework of 
the revolutionary political climate, legal arrangements to protect the status of 
the Diyanet were made by Article 89 of the Law of Political Parties, Law 2820 
of 22 April 1983. This article which still is in use provides for the banning of 
political parties that propagate the abolishment of the Diyanet.
The absence of a clergy in Islam31 has been a means of legitimising the state’s 
intervention in religion and categorizing it as a public service.32 Defining public 
services as activities managed by public legal entities or by private entities 
supervised by the state for the purpose of meeting a shared and general need 
which has acquired a certain importance for the people, the state’s involve-
ment in religious affairs, in my opinion, does not conflict with laicist/secularist 
principles. An assessment of the duties of the Diyanet in this context reveals 
that duties such as ‘the management of places of prayer’ and ‘providing correct 
publications of the Koran’ are indeed public services that may be justifiable in 
order to fulfill a collective need. However, the state makes use of the Diyanet 
as an administrative tool to indoctrinate and propagate official ideology re-
garding Islam, while fulfilling duties like “enlightening society about religion” 
and “religious education”. An interesting point here is the differing policies of 
administrations over time. Certainly institutions are organisms constituted by 
human agents that process their own dynamics according to their agendas, 
thus sociologically and anthropologically it is interesting to scrutinize texts 
produced by various authorities of the Diyanet.
30 For a very illuminating analysis of the influential body of work by the eminent scholar Mehmed Fuad 
Köprülü in this context see Markus Dressler, Writing Religion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
31 “The absence of a clergy in Islam means that there is no special class equipped with holy abilities 
to speak on behalf of God and religion.” Ali Bardakoğlu, Religion and Society: New Perspectives from 
Turkey (Ankara: Publications of Presidency of Religious Affairs, 2006), p.11.
32 Prof. Ali Bardakoğlu states that, “… the Diyanet emerged as a response to a social need for the organi-
zation of religious affairs and in order to provide religious services. The establishment of the Diyanet 
can also be seen as a response to the problem of sustaining public stability in the area of religious 
affairs and as a way to meet the public demand for satisfactory religious services.” See Ali Bardakoğlu, 
“Moderate Perception of Islam’ and the Turkish Model of the Diyanet: The President’s Statement”, 24:2 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (October 2004), p. 368.
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It is consented by various authorities of Diyanet over the years that produc-
tion and transmission of religious knowledge is a prominent task of the insti-
tution. Religious in this context refers predominantly to Islam. Professor Ali 
Bardakoğlu, a former president of the institution, especially underlines this 
mission on very many occasions. He states that “the Diyanet has a particular 
role in the production and transmission of religious knowledge.”33 Bardakoğlu 
suggests, it “… provide(s) sound religious information”.34 
The Diyanet takes religious demands and traditional forms into account when 
delivering its services. However, if and when there is a departure from shared 
and sustained interpretations, the Diyanet then promotes authentic know-
ledge; it strives to educate people about their religious beliefs, and practices 
in the light of sound knowledge and scholarship. Sound knowledge helps in 
fighting superstitions, ignorance, false ideas, misuses of religion and abuses 
in the name of religion.35 “We are trying to understand religion as religion … 
to perceive it through its sources in a true knowledge, and to transmit it to 
our people in that way.”36
Preference for using adjectives like sound, authentic, true,37 healthy38 indicate 
an essentialist approach that produces categories of legitimate and illegitimate 
religions. This may be read as a predictable outcome of the legal and political 
construction of religion in the Republican times of Turkey. As for Islam, it has 
been the task of the Diyanet “to define, represent, organize, and regulate its 
public forms. (…) Religious activities outside the oversight of the state are still 
perceived as a threat.”39 What is interesting is to observe the state reflexes 
thereof. There appear much fewer differences than what may be expected 
between the early Republican times with its strong Kemalist rhetoric, and the 
last decade with a series of pro-Islamic AK Party governments for religious 
activities outside the oversight of the state.
33 Ali Bardakoğlu, “Moderate Perception of Islam’ and the Turkish Model of the Diyanet: The President’s 
Statement”, 24:2 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (October 2004), p. 367.
34 Ibid., p. 369.
35 Ibid., p. 371.
36 TV interview, ATV: Teke Tek hosted by Fatih Altaylı on 9 February 2006. For the text see Ali Bardakoğlu, 
21. Yüzyıl Türkiye’sinde Din ve Diyanet II (Ankara: DİB Yayınları, 2010), p. 201.
37 TV interview, Channel 7: Ters Köşe hosted by Akif Beki & Fehmi Koru on 21 December 2003. For the 
text see Ali Bardakoğlu, supra note 37, , p. 117.
38 TV interview, Channel 7: İskele Sancak hosted by Ahmet Hakan Coşkun on 16 January 2004. For the 
text see Ali Bardakoğlu, supra note 37, p. 128.
39 Markus Dressler, “Making Religion through Secularist Legal Discourse: The Case of Turkish Alevism” in 
M. Dressler and A.S. Mandair (eds.), Secularism & Religion-Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 191.
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The most important work of the Diyanet regarding the Koran was in the first 
years of the Republic; Elmalı’s interpretation entitled ‘Hak Dini Kuran Dili’, 
which has been an important interpretation up until today, was commissioned 
by the Diyanet and published in 1936. 
Elmalı indicates that while he was writing his interpretation he followed the 
Sunni sect with regard to the creed and the Hanafi sect with regard to the 
practice. It is likely that he was asked to write his interpretation this way and he 
obeyed it, because whereas he shows more dynamic and relaxed attitude in his 
other works, he shows a more conservative attitude in his interpretation.40
When the Association of Turkish Women reacted to the statements given below 
in the hadith work of the twelve-volume ‘Sahih-i Buhari Muhtasarı Tecrid-i 
Sarih Tercümesi ve Şerhi’, the Diyanet commented that this book was publis-
hed solely for commercial purposes: 
The testimony of two women is equal to the testimony of one man. Women 
are deficient in both reason and religion. Women are bad luck. The things that 
spoil praying are dogs, donkeys, pigs and women. Hand contact with a foreign 
woman is hand adultery. Most of the people in hell are women.41  
In a decision, dated 2 June 2003, about women becoming witnesses in judicial 
process and on gendered principles of inheritance, the High Council of Religi-
ous Affairs stated the following:
According to Islam, ontologically and also with regards to religious respon-
sibility, legal competence, and fundamental rights and freedoms, there is, in 
principle, no difference between a man and a woman. The difference indicated 
in the verse about borrowing emerges in the light of the conditions of the pe-
riod which reflected a passive role for the women in the commercial activities, 
and does not contain a general arrangement. When the verses regarding this 
subject are considered as a whole, the testimony of a woman is equal to the 
testimony of a man; however, on the inheritance law,
 (…) Women are not usually responsible for providing subsistence for others. 
However, men are on the contrary obligated to ensure subsistence of their 
spouses, their daughters, their mothers or sisters in nearly all societies. The-
40 Sait Şimşek, “İslamcılık ve Kuran”, in Y.Aktay (ed.) Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce cilt 6: İslamcılık, 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 703.
41 See Süleyman Ateş, “Diyanet İşleri Gözü ile Kadın”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 16 January 1990, p.15.
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refore, in accordance with the principle of ‘blessing as much as the burden 
experienced’, a man who is responsible for ensuring the subsistence of his 
spouse, daughter and mother or sister, is given twice the share of a woman 
who does not have such an obligation. 
b)  A woman has the right to use her financial assets any way she wants. 
Even if her financial condition is good, she does not have to take part in 
the family expenses. Therefore, from this perspective, in the case when 
both a woman and a man take equal shares, since he is under obligation 
to provide for his family and she is not, this will upset the balance against 
him.
c)  A man is obligated to give mehir (some amount of property and goods) to 
his spouse. However, not only does a woman not have such an obligation, 
she also earns the right to get mehir from her spouse. 
d)  Although during the Islamic waiting period of a divorce process the man 
is obligated to cover his wife’s expenses such as housing, food, clothing 
and medical treatment, the woman does not have such an obligation 
towards her husband. 
As one can see, concerning the financial obligations, far from being equal to 
a man, in fact a woman is in an advantageous position. In many areas, the 
financial obligations are imposed on the man. Therefore, because of the rea-
sons given above, in dividing the inheritance among the siblings, the man re-
ceives, in accordance with the weight of his financial obligations, two shares; 
and having no financial obligations, the woman receives one share. This is the 
fairest and the most just inheritance division.”42 
Efforts of balancing gender equality and Islamic principles of the Diyanet 
through khutbas43 and in expanded services to women under the generic title 
of family guidance within the last decade is an interesting process that reveals 
the continuities and raptures of patriarchal mentalities of not only the Turkish 
state in time but also the society as well.
42 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, “Kurul Kararları Kurul Kararları Kadınların Şahit ve Mirasçı Olmaları”, 2 June 
2003, http://malatyamuftulugu.gov.tr/kadinlarin-sahit-ve-mirasci-olmalari.html, accessed 28 June 
2013.  
43 For some interesting analysis on Friday khutbas see James Gibbon, “Between Religion and the State: 
Democracy, Religious Markets, and Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs” (unpublished paper 
presented at the Ninth Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence & Montecatini Terme, 25-28 March 
2009); Ceren Kenar, Bargaining Between Islam and Kemalism: An Investigation of Official Islam Through 
Friday Sermons (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2011); Muhammet Habib Saçmalı, Compliance and 
Negotiation: The Role of Turkish Diyanet in the Production of Friday Khutbas (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi Uni-
versity, 2013).
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A Diyanet publication, entitled ‘21. Yüzyıl Türkiye’sinde Hurafeler’ (Superstitions 
in 21st Century Turkey) pursues the goal of “raising awareness of the people 
against superstitions” with a list that includes among others the following:44 
“to hope for help from places like tombs and holy burials”; lighting a candle 
at a holy person’s burial and making a wish; believing that getting married 
between two religious holidays is unlucky; that an itch on right palm means 
money will come, an itch on left palm means money will be gone, and an itch 
under the foot means a trip will be taken; walking under a ladder is bad luck; 
having a complete Koran reading or Islamic memorial service on the 7th, 40th 
and 52nd days and the anniversary of the funeral; believing that the pictures 
drawn on sand or soil by the seaside on the day of the Hıdrellez celebration 
will be owned later on; fortune reading of a drunken coffee cup, going to the 
fortune tellers and wizards; to believe that whoever (the bride or the groom) 
steps on the foot of the other one during a marriage ceremony will have the 
saying in the house; to have an evil eye bead, to carry an amulet. Thus, many 
practices encountered frequently in the Turkish ‘folk’ Islamic culture45 appear 
to be disapproved by the Diyanet. 
Diyanet announced the recruitment of Kurdish Islamic clergymen, called meles 
by the Kurds, as imams in south-eastern parts of Turkey. A mele is a traditional 
religious figure of vital importance among the Kurds, and he takes a leader-
ship role in resolving societal issues such as tribal matters, honour crimes and 
blood feuds. They are highly respected community leaders, who have a great 
impact on the Kurds.46
44 “In the introduction of the book, it is pointed out that the beliefs and practices which lack logical 
base and have no relation with the real life can be found in every religion and stated that ignorance, 
loneliness, helplessness, desperateness, fear, sadness, sickness, stress and disasters push people 
towards the trap of superstitions. The book stresses that it paves the way for taking root, in the world 
of ideas, of ignorance, superstitions, baseless interpretations and awry understandings.” See Taraf 
Gazetesi, “Bunların hepsi hurafeymiş”, 10 December 2008, p. 4. For emphasis on “true/correct Islam” 
and “superstitions” see Ali Bardakoğlu, “Hurafeyi Sahih Bilgi ile Aşmak”, 186 Diyanet Aylık Dergi, (June 
2006), p. 1; Kıyasettin Koçoğlu, “21. Yüzyılın Türkiye’sinde Hurafeler”, 186 Diyanet Aylık Dergi, (June 
2006), pp. 5-8; Fikret Karaman, “Modern Hayat ve Hurafeler”,186 Diyanet Aylık Dergi, (June 2006), pp. 
15-17.  
45 See Şerif Mardin, Din ve İdeoloji (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1969) p. 
115 and on. For a work that calls these kinds of beliefs as “superstitous” and “fallacious” and proposes 
the matter to be solved through education, see Fatma Yılmaz, Din Eğitimi Işığında Kadınlar Arasında 
Yaşayan Hurafeler (Istanbul : Cihan Yayınları, 2008).
46 Ayhan Kaya, Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey: The Myth of Toleration (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2013), p.112.
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Currently, the Diyanet is a significant actor in the international realms of the 
Turkish Islamic sphere47 because of the Turkish state’s financial and organi-
zational support. Until the 1980s, the Diyanet’s access had been limited to 
Turkey’s Muslims. However, after the coup of 1980, the Diyanet expanded its 
activities into countries with Turkish immigrant populations.48 Since the early 
1980’s the Diyanet has been sending imams to Europe to counterbalance the 
influence of other Islamic communities on Turkish Muslims and to maintain 
their loyalty to the Turkish state.49 “To counter undesirable Islamic influences, 
Diyanet is to propagate the ‘correct’ Sunni Islam through the mosques and 
compulsory classes on Islam, with a strong emphasis on ethics, human rights, 
and each citizen’s duties towards state and country.”50 It seems in this context 
that the majority of the Diyanet followers do not have a collective identity as 
a member of community separate from the Diyanet, and consider the Diyanet 
to be above any Islamic community.51 However the Diyanet’s role in internati-
onal affairs is not limited to migrants with a Turkish background; but also for 
a role as an actor thereof.52
47 For the role of the Diyanet to be evaluated as a preferring to be “a prestigious referee position instead 
of taking sides” see Mehmet Görmez, “Religion and Secularism in the Modern World: A Turkish Per-
spective”, 2 Turkish Policy Brief Series (February 2012), p. 7.
48 “In the Netherlands, the local host association of the Diyanet was established in 1982 and was soon 
running more than 140 mosques, becoming the largest Muslim association in the country. In Germany, 
the Diyanet Foundation was founded around the same time and now has more than 800 mosques in 
its fold. In all cases, it is the Presidency in Ankara that appoints imams for service abroad (usually for 
three years); these imams are coordinated by an attaché for religious affairs in the respective embassy. 
The attaché is a member of the presidency, and not of the foreign office staff.” Kerem Öktem, “New 
Islamic actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans”, (European Studies 
Centre: University of Oxford), December 2010, <balkanmuslims.com/pdf/Oktem-Balkan-Muslims.
pdf>, accessed 28 June 2013. p. 32.
49 For a comparative analysis of the Turkish Muslim organizations in Western Europe with a special focus 
on the Diyanet see Nico Landmann, “Sustaining Turkish-Islamic Loyalities: The Diyanet in Western 
Europe” in H. Poulton and S. Farouki (eds.), Muslim Identity and the Balkan State (London: Hurst & 
Company, 1997), pp. 214-231. 
50 Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, The European Union, Turkey and Islam, (Amster-
dam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), p. 53.
51 Ahmet Yükleyen, Localizing Islam in Europe: Turkish Islamic Communities in Germany and the Netherlands, 
(Syracuse: New York: Syracuse University Press, 2012), pp. 21-23.
52 For the Diyanet’s role in Turkish foreign policy with a special focus on Eurasia see Şenol Korkut, “The 
Diyanet of Turkey and its Activities in Eurasia after the Cold War”, 28 Acta Slavica Japonica 2010, pp. 
117-139, < src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/acta/28/06Korkut.pdf>, accessed 27 June 2013. For 
a very good analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans involving the Diyanet see Kerem Öktem, 
“New Islamic actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans”, (European 
Studies Centre: University of Oxford), December 2010, <balkanmuslims.com/pdf/Oktem-Balkan-
Muslims.pdf>, accessed 28 June 2013.
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Diyanet as an institution has produced its own dynamics in spite of the official 
ideology which tried to shape it. Thus it has taken a meaning and significance 
to the point of making the proposal of abolishing the institution and leaving 
the religious realm to the religious communities not very meaningful. Moreover, 
the extensive network of the Diyanet all over Turkey and abroad, which no other 
administrative body enjoys in the Turkish system, is a great opportunity for all 
governments, regardless of their positions in the political spectrum. However, 
the institution should not remain attached to its status tightly and should be 
reorganized in accordance with the demands of the interested actors. It is not 
possible for those who use the political power in a contemporary democratic 
state and present themselves as the representatives of the society to ignore 
the wishes of the social corpus. Therefore those who seek to be represented in 
the Diyanet should be given the opportunity. Also those that demand to have 
similar institutions should be legally facilitated.
IV. In the Scope of Freedoms of Thought, 
Conscience and Religion
The principle of equality, construed and applied as ‘equality in blessings and 
burden’ by the Turkish Constitutional Court, requires that all persons eligible 
for a public service should be able to benefit from such service in a free and 
equitable manner. The first problem that arises when the subject of public ser-
vice is religion, is that the state is focused on a single religion rather than on 
services including all religions in the territory. However as concerns our present 
subject matter, this problem is relatively easy to deal with, because Islam is the 
religion of the majority of the people and services related to other religions 
are provided by the respective communities according to the provisions of the 
Lausanne Treaty.53 However, services to be offered to other Islamic understan-
dings with different practices like Alevism pose a problem. 
A draft law prepared in 1963 for defining the organization and duties of the 
Diyanet proposed the establishment of a “Presidency of Religious Sects.” This 
53 It should also be noted that, whereas the Lausanne Treaty has recognized a number of rights for certain 
non-Muslim communities and individuals that have been defined in the Treaty as “the minorities”, 
such legal provisions have largely remained unapplied. Thus, in practice, non-Muslim communities 
may not provide some religious services to their members as will be mentioned later in this article.
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proposal, however, was criticized on the grounds that it could “pave the way 
for official separation” and was never implemented. 
The Diyanet claims that Alevis and Sunnites are not subject to discrimination 
because, except for certain local customs and beliefs, there are no differences 
between these two interpretations regarding basic religious issues; hence this 
indicates a denial of a separate ‘Alevi’ religious identity. The fact that Sun-
nites constitute the majority apparently appears to be justifiable to Turkish 
Republican laic elite, as the state disregards other sects. The Diyanet pretends 
to be unaware of the religious belief of the Alevi population and the building 
of mosques in Alevi villages is a pressure exerted by the state to implant the 
Sunnite belief in this section of society.54 
Legal recognition of religious group autonomy and places of worship is a pil-
lar of religious freedom. A state that denies a religious community the very 
opportunity to establish and operate a place of worship is surely under a se-
vere burden to justify it.55 The European Court of Human Rights has taken a 
dim view of such matters. In Manoussakis v. Greece,56 the state was held to 
be “restricting the activities of faiths outside the Orthodox church”. In Hasan 
and Chaoush v. Bulgaria, the applicants complained that the state had inter-
fered with their right to organise their faith. The Court maintained that “the 
personality of the religious ministers is undoubtedly of importance to every 
member of the community”.57 In 2001 a similar violation of Article 9 was found 
by the European Court of Human Rights regarding the Moldovian government’s 
refusal to recognize and register the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia.58 The 
common theme held by the Court in these cases is no state may be capable of 
arguing against definitions of rituals or places of worships of a faith-group. 
In 1999, when Turkey officially began its bid to enter the European Union, re-
lations between the state and religion started to take a democratic turn. “The 
decision on principles, priorities, and conditions in the Accession Partnership 
54 For a recent report of 2012 released by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor titled, “Turkey: International Religious freedom Report” including information and le-
gal/policy framework on Alevis see <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/#wrapper>, 
accessed 28 June 2013.
55 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford & New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), p. 347.
56 Manoussakis v. Greece, 05 July 1995, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 18748/91..
57 Hasan and Chaoush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 
30985/96, para. 62.
58 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldavia, 13 Dcember 2001, European Court of Human Rights, 
Application No. 2002/ 35.
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with Turkey includes the requirement that Turkey guarantees ‘in law and prac-
tice’ the full enjoyment of human rights and freedoms by all without discri-
mination on grounds of religion and belief.”59 It also requires Turkey to “adopt 
and implement provisions concerning the exercise of freedom of thought, con-
science and religion by all individuals and religious communities’ in line with 
the ECHR, as well as to take into account recommendations of the Commissi-
on against Racism and Intolerance, an institution of the Council of Europe.”60 
Yet another requirement in this context for Turkey is “to establish conditions 
for the functioning of religious communities, including legal and judicial pro-
tection – inter alia, through legal personality of the communities, their mem-
bers, and assets, teaching, appointment and training of clergy, and enjoyment 
of property rights in line with Protocol 1 ECHR”.61 Furthermore, Turkey must 
“adopt a law comprehensively addressing the difficulties faced by non-Muslim 
religious communities in line with the relevant European standards. Suspend 
all sales or confiscation of properties which belong or belonged to non-Muslim 
religious community foundations by the competent authorities pending adop-
tion of the abovementioned law.”62 Thus religious freedom, religious equality, 
autonomy of religious associations, and a special protection of religion have 
been targeted to be secured by the EU.63 
V. Conclusion
States should make no choices in terms of what should be the good in its 
citizen’s lives, instead leaving that choice to the individuals concerned. The li-
beral state is not to do anything intended to favour or promote any particular 
comprehensive doctrine rather than another, nor to give greater assistance to 
those who pursue it.64 Nozick’s observation that no one way of living can satisfy 
the aspirations of all the individuals within a society, is one that is accepted 
by most and perhaps all liberal states. 65 
59 Norman Doe, Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 243; See also Council Decision/EC 2006/35 (2006) OJ L22/34, 37.
60 Council Decision/EC 2006/35 (2006) OJ L22/34, 37, 38. 
61 Council Decision/EC 2006/35 (2006) OJ L22/34, 38.
62 Council Decision/EC 2006/35 (2006) OJ L22/34, 37.
63 Doe, supra note 60, pp. 237-258.
64 John Rawls, “The priority of the rights and ideas of the good”, 17:4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 1988, 
p. 262.
65 Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), pp. 307-310. 
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However, especially the recent practices of the AK Party government reveal 
that their understanding of the state in Turkey seems not to be a liberal one. 
Legislative and other legally regulative attempts regarding issues like aborti-
on, and matters involving homosexuality etc. are bricks of social engineering 
for an imagined social corpus where the good has already been designed, very 
similar to the practices of the early Republican elite of Turkey in the 1920’s 
and 30’s to achieve their own good for the people.
It is a fact that far from separating the affairs of religion and state from each 
other, Islam fuses them together. It intends to attach not only the inner worlds 
of the individuals, but also their behaviours within the state to the sublime 
rules. Therefore, the steps that were taken by the state of Turkey in the direc-
tion of laicism were perceived as a direct attack on the Islamic culture. Alt-
hough some of the reforms of the Atatürk period were seen as directly con-
cerning the religion itself, they were also the legal means the founding cadres 
of the Republic used to transform the society. Intending to restructure the 
various existing cultural codes of the society, starting with the alphabet, the 
founding cadres were not content with a project of transforming simply the 
superstructure institutions as it was done in the Ottoman modernization, but 
intended to change the whole Turkish society. The political cadres that foun-
ded the Republic of Turkey tried to push religion into the sphere of personal 
belief. However, this policy did not produce results especially within the rural 
population and even among a section of the urban population. One can read 
the continuity of religion in these two groups as the outcome of the fact that 
Islam is not only a belief for them, but represents a series of social practices 
with multi-dimensional functions. Although the dervish lodges were closed, the 
religious networks and the life styles of the conservative segments were still 
maintained behind the scenes. Meanwhile, Turkey experienced stable econo-
mic development that included a population increase of 2-3% per year since 
the 1950s. This created employment opportunities in the cities, attracting the 
rural population in great numbers and starting the process of the formation 
of squatter neighbourhoods. In this process, both the state, through channels 
such as the Diyanet, and some civil society institutions continued mutually 
their efforts to fulfil religious needs. 
Thus, both with the internal dynamics and changing paradigms in the world, I 
think that religion should be considered, at the legal level, within the frame-
work of the two higher constitutional principles in Turkey of the 2000s, which 
without any doubt that has a very different setting than of 1924. One of these 
principles is the freedom of conscience and religion, one of the fundamental 
rights and duties, and the other one is laicism.
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Article 19 of the 1961 Constitution and Article 19 of the 1982 Constitution 
provides that belief, whether or not adopted by the majority of people living 
in that country, would be a subject of freedom. With an amendment made in 
Articles 175-178 of the Turkish Penal Code titled “Crimes against the Freedom 
of Religion”, the protection of the freedoms of religious belief and worship has 
been provided to all religions without any discrimination. On the other hand, 
freedom of religious belief includes not believing as well. In order to provide a 
peaceful co-existence to various groups in a society, it is imperative that those 
who do not share a belief, to have the same right to go on with their own daily 
routines as those who have the freedom to fulfil the requirements of their own 
beliefs. A typical implementation of this should be seen in the fasting ritual of 
the Ramadan, a requirement of Islam. While believers fast during this month 
in order to fulfil a requirement of their belief, those who are not part of this 
belief should not be deprived of the means of continuing their daily lives. It is 
a fact that masses with Islamic sensibilities have been oppressed and deprived 
of their various needs especially during the early Republican times in Turkey. 
However, another danger nowadays lies in the transformation of religious 
practices and its ethical rules into legal ones. As Taylor suggests, “the point 
of state neutrality is precisely to avoid favouring or disfavouring not just reli-
gious positions but any basic position, religious or nonreligious”.66 Freedom of 
religion is very fundamental, but exactly the similar respect should be given 
to freedom from religion as well. I believe that this balance is the challenge 
for achieving a society of liberty and equality – but apparently an extremely 
difficult one indeed.
66 “Why we need a radical redefinition of secularism”, in E. Mendieta and J. VanAntwerpen (eds), The 
Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) p. 37.
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